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GATES, LEON, AND THE COMPROMISE OF
ADJUDICATIVE FAIRNESS (PART I): A DIALOGUE ON
PREJUDICIAL CONCURRENCES
JOEL JAY FINER*
[A] member of the Supreme Court must lay upon himself a selfHe may not talk about the future. The
denying ordinance ....
future is what we make of it, and is here almost as we speak.'
All judges in lively controversies are "more or less prejudiced."
But between that "more or less" lies the whole kingdom of the
mind; the differences between the "more or less" are the triumphs of disinterestedness, they are the aspirations we call
justice.2
INTRODUCTION

n July 5, 1984 the Supreme Court in Leon v. United States3 held
that where law enforcement officials execute a search warrant issued
in violation of the dictates of the fourth amendment but act in the "goodfaith," "objectively-reasonable" belief that the warrant was constitutionally valid, the fruits of the search should not (with a few exceptions) be
excluded from evidence under the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United
States4 and Mapp v. Ohio.' Except for the application of the Weeks exclusionary rule itself to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, the Leon decision was
the most significant development in exclusionary rule jurisprudence in
the past seventy years.
On June 8, 1983, in Illinois v. Gates," the Supreme Court, after calling
for and receiving briefs and arguments on the issue of whether the exclu-

* B.B.A., City College of New York; M.A., LL.B., Yale University, Professor of Law,
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. The author acknowledges the support and critical readings rendered by his colleagues, Professor Thomas D. Buckley, Jr., and Professor James G.
Wilson of Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, as well as the excellent research support for
this work from Cleveland Marshall Reference/Media Librarian, Judith Kaul.
1 G. HELLMAN, BENJAMIN N. CARDozo: AMERICAN JUDGE 271, 292 (1940), quoted in Westin, Out-of-Court Commentary by United States Supreme Court Justices, 1790-1962: Of
Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 635 (1962).
* FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 78 (P. Kurland 1970).
104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).
4 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
o 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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sionary rule should be modified, concluded, for reasons of jurisdiction and
prudence, that it could not reach that question in that case. The facts in
Gates were that the police obtained a search warrant on the basis of a
letter from an anonymous informant charging the defendant with engaging in interstate drug trafficking and asserting that the defendant kept
drugs in his Illinois home. Under then existing fourth amendment doctrine-the Aguilar and Spinelli test (at least as interpreted by many
lower courts, including the Illinois Supreme Court in Gates)-a warrant
could not be validly issued on the word of an anonymous informant unless there was some evidence indicating the basis of the informant's
knowledge (how he or she came by the reported information) and some
evidence to justify the conclusion that the informant was truthful or, alternatively, the informant's information was reliable.7 The Gates majority
opinion concluded that the observations of law enforcement officers of
Lance Gates' activities, together with the information in the tip, were insufficient to satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements for probable cause.
The Court found those requirements unduly restrictive, however, and
overruled Auguilar and Spinelli. The five Justices joining the majority
applying a reformulated test of probable cause, s found that the warrant
was properly issued, and, reversing the Illinois Supreme Court, upheld
the conviction.
Justice White separately concurred in Gates.' He concluded that the
warrant was validly issued even under the Aguilar and Spinelli restrictions, restrictions which he found to be valid.
An additional and extensively elaborated basis for Justice White's vote
to uphold Gates' conviction was his belief that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should be modified to admit evidence that was the product of a search warrant obtained and executed by the police in the good
faith, objectively-reasonable belief that their action was constitutionally
valid.
This two-part Article is about certain qualities of fairness-those qualities that although subtle, are central to the idea and spirit of justice in
adjudication. This Article is about how those qualities were subverted in
the process by which the doctrine of United States v. Leon became law.
A fair hearing is more than the sum of its parts. It requires an attitude
of detachment, a spirit of neutrality, a commitment to listen receptively
to the arguments contending for acceptance. The central, significant attributes that sum up the idea of a fair hearing are the capacity and the
willingness of a judge to approach a case with an open mind. This twopart Article advances the thesis that the Leon majority was unable and

' See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969).
8 462 U.S. at 238-39.
Id. at 246.
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unwilling to accord a fair hearing to the arguments in favor of retention
of the seventy year-old Weeks doctrine requiring exclusion of evidence
unconstitutionally obtained by law-enforcement officers.
Part I of the Article-A Dialogue On Prejudical Concurrences-published herein, suggests that several members of the Leon majority (particularly its author, Justice White) were unable to impartially adjudicate
the constitutional question because of pre-decisional gratuitous opinions
(from the bench) on the subject. More specifically, the Dialogue explores
the virtually unquestioned assumption that a judge cannot sensibly or
meaningfully be criticized for being "prejudiced" or "partial" on matters
of law.
Part II, to be published in a later issue, argues that even viewed independently of prior prejudicial concurrences, the majority opinion in Leon
manifested an unwillingness to accord the parties and the nation a fair
adjudication, demonstrating both "aggressive prosecutorialism" (e.g.
agenda-driven pursuit of crime-control values) and a "willful refusal to
listen" (e.g. to acknowledge, respond to or treat with reason and candor,
rather than by peremptory dismissal or transparently evasive rationalizations) the views advanced by counsel before the Court and expressed in
the body of legal scholarship addressing the relevant questions. These
flaws were further manifested in the Leon majority's gratuitous "reaching
out" to make law, its unilateral adversarialism, its result-determining manipulation of the burden of appellate argument, its dubious assumptions
about the prevailing values motivating magistrates who review search
warrant applications, its attempts at computational derivations of net
constitutional justice ("cost-benefit analysis"), and its indifference to the
probable repressive consequences of the quasi-demagogic atmospherics, if
not the literal substance of the opinion.
A central thesis of Part II is that if the performance of our adjudicatory
system has fallen short of fulfilling the high expectations of "procedural
due process" it may well be substantially due to a failure of an essential
mediating factor between pro forma procedural safeguards and substantive justice. That factor is the earnest undertaking, by an adjudicator of a
commitment to listen to not-insubstantial arguments legitimately before
the Court. Part II attempts partial elaborations of the concept of "aggressive adjudication"'10 and the ideas of "duty to listen actively"' 1 and "willOThe use of the adjective "aggressive" to describe a court's judicial disposition derives
from the excellent article by Professor Stone. Stone, O.T. 1983 and the Era of Aggressive
Majoritarianism:A Court in Transition, 19 GA. L. REV. 15 (1984). Among the judicial behaviors that fall within my proposed definition of a judicially aggressive opinion are the
following: failure to acknowledge or respond to an important contention, dismissing a contention peremptorily, advancing false and sweeping generalizations, declaring an unprovable
proposition to be the case merely because the contrary cannot be demonstrated, denying an
allegation that was never made, and falsely stereotyping the party's philosophy.
" When the Supreme Court grants a party a hearing (i.e., briefing and oral presenta-
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ful deafness," finding United States v. Leon an unusually fertile source of
illustrative material.
In reaching his conclusions in Gates regarding the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule, Justice White advanced numerous contentions
and assertions about the rationale, importance, impact, and limits of the
exclusionary rule: The rule, being a "remedy" rather than "a personal
constitutional right,"12 is not to be applied to situations which produce
greater costs than benefits.'" The exclusion of probative evidence of guilt
is itself a high cost;1 4 and because of the exclusionary rule, a significant

number of felony cases in general, and an even greater percentage of drug
cases in particular, 1 5 are lost, because declined for prosecution. The rule
deters reasonable police investigation, 0 imposes a tremendous burden on
the federal and state judicial systems, 7 and undermines public confidence in, and respect for, law.' 8 In view of such costs, those who would
retain the exclusionary rule "must bear a heavy burden of justification."'
Since the deterrent efficacy of the exclusionary rule cannot be empirically
demonstrated,20 particularly in situations where the police act in the
good-faith-i.e., "of ojectively reasonable" belief that their actions are
constitutional2 (such "objective-reasonableness" being prima facie present where a search warrant has been issued by a neutral magistrate 2 ) the rule should not ordinarily be applied in such situations. The deterrence or punishment of magistrates who might invalidly issue search warrants is not the function of the exclusionary rule, Justice White
declared.

23

Thirteen months after issuing his concurrence in Gates, Justice White
authored the majority opinion in Leon.2 " That opinion expressed most of
the points made by Justice White the year before, and added nothing
lending further weight to his recent identical legal conclusion. 5

tion), it impliedly agrees to read and listen to the contentions proferred by the party: to
listen is to maintain a state of intellectually active receptivity to all non-frivolous
contentions.
11462 U.S. at 257.
33 Id.

Id.
I at 257, n.13.
Id.
Id. at 258.
.7 Id.
"

Is Id.
19Id. at 257-58.
2I Id. at 259-60.

Id. at 260-61.
IId. at 262.
13Id. at 262-63.
4 104 S.Ct. 3405.

21

20

See text accompanying infra note 120.
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PART I: PREJUDICIAL CONCURRENCES:

A

DIALOGUE

Gratuitous, comprehensive and conclusive declarations of law in concurring opinions have come to be taken for granted for so long by observers of the Supreme Court that one hesitates to question the propriety or
prudence of the practice, save that the risk of confessing one's ignorance
of learned explanations may be outweighed by the value to the decisional
process of articulating these felt improprieties.
Were I Mr. Leon, or Mr. Sheppard, 6 (or one of their attorneys), or a
legally unsophisticated, yet ethically sensitive observer of the passing judicial scene (perhaps contemplating attendance at a law school), I would
find it difficult to understand how Mr. Leon could receive a fair adjudication of the legal issues his case presented when four Justices in earlier
concurrences or dissents had publically asserted that the exclusionary
rule should not be applied where the police had acted in good-faith and/
or in reasonable belief that their action was consistent with the requirements of the fourth amendment. 7
What follows, in a dialogic form, is an exploration of the idea of prejudicial concurrences, with particular emphasis on the concurrence of Justice White in Illinois v.Gates, in light of his opinion for the majority
thirteen months later in Leon.
When he wrote the Leon opinion, Justice White had
recently written what seemed like a gratuitous concurrence in a case
where he spelled out, point by point, in no uncertain terms, how the law
should be interpreted in a situation just like Mr. Leon's, even though not
one of the other Justices in that earlier case addressed the subject (indeed
the majority explicitly decided not to decide it),"' and even though the
Leon and Sheppard cases were on the immediate horizon.2" Now that's
one of the reasons why I've decided to go to law school-so I could have
explained to me how parties before the Supreme Court, before any court,
can receive a fair and impartial hearing from Justices who have made up
their minds as to how a case should be decided before the briefs are even
filed.
NAIVE OBSERVER:

You are of course correct in perceiving that it is
wrong, indeed professionally unethical 0 and even unlawful,2 ' for a judge
LEARNED LAWYER:

2"

Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S.Ct. 3424 (1984), was a companion case with Leon.

"7See infra note 86. There was also an ambivalent pre-confirmation statement by a
fifth now-sitting Justice, Sandra Day O'Connor. See infro notes 56-60 and accompanying
text.
28 Gates, 462 U.S. at 224.
29 The Leon case was docketed on March 29, 1983, over two months prior to the decision in Gates. 52 U.S.L.W. 3807 (1983). Certiorari in Leon was not granted until June 27,
1983. 103 S.Ct. 3535 (1983).
O ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(c)(1)(1972) (hereinafter cited as the CODE)

states the following: "A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impar-
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to be prejudiced, partial or biased32 in the matter before him; he or she
must not only be neutral and detached, i.e., impartial, but must appear to
be impartial as well.
Where you go wrong is in your notion that a judge can be improperly
prejudiced or biased about the law and in your evident assumption that a
party has a right to a hearing on questions of law generally and before the
United States Supreme Court in particular.
If you will allow me to proceed to elaborate upon these and other verities known to all true students of the law, you will be enlightened and
edified and need not ever be troubled again by your unfortunate
confusion.
You see, it is not an appellate court's function to decide the law as a
trial court or jury decides the facts; it is not its function to decide which
33
of two legal positions contended for by the parties is more "probative.
Courts, particularly the Supreme Court, can and do consult their understanding of the law (and even of legislative facts), 34 regardless of what or
whether the parties (by their attorneys) actually argue.
A very distinguished jurist, the late federal appellate judge, Jerome
Frank, eloquently conveyed the idea that judges do hold, and are expected to hold, views about the law-often strong and deep views. His
observations are worth quoting at some length:
Democracy must, indeed, fail unless our courts try cases fairly,
and there can be no fair trial before a judge lacking in impartiality and disinterestedness. If, however, 'bias' and 'partiality' be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the mind of
the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever
will. The human mind, even at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with predispositions; and the process of education, formal and informal, creates attitudes in all men which affect them in judging situations, attitudes which precede reasoning
in particular instances and which, therefore, by definition, are
prejudices. To live is to have a vocation, and to have a vocation is
to have an ethics or scheme of values, and to have a scheme of
values is to have a point of view, and to have a point of view is to

tiality might reasonably questioned."
" See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982).

" The precepts of Canon 3(C)(1), supra note 30, are closely related to those of CODE
Canon 2(A): "A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality

of the judiciary." (Emphasis added). Public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary
would normally be undermined where that "[partiality] might reasonably be questioned."
CooE Canon 3(C)(1), i.e., where there is even the appearance of impropriety. CODE Canon 2
(Commentary).
" Cf. Hyneman, Administrative Adjudication, 51 POL. Sci. Q. 383, 516 (1936).
34

See infra note 125.
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have a prejudice or bias ....

An "open mind," in the sense of a

mind containing no preconceptions whatever, would be a mind
incapable of learning anything, would be that of an utterly emotionless human being, corresponding, roughly to the psychiatrist's
description of the feeble-minded.
The standard of dispassionateness obviously does not require
the judge to rid himself of the unconscious influence of such social attitudes. 3
The idea of a judge being "prejudiced" about the law has been refuted
by the experts. For example, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, in an early
edition of his Treatise on Administrative Law, states that "[b]ias in the
sense of a crystallized point of view about issues of law or policy is almost
universally deemed no ground for disqualification. " ' 31 Indeed, when the
current revision of the Code of Judicial Conduct was drafted, the original
draft-revision called for disqualification when a judge "had a fixed belief
concerning the merits" of a case. 3 ' The draftsmen were, however, persuaded to substitute the present "standard of personal bias or prejudice
for [the original] formulation. '38
Professor Wayne Thode, Reporter to the ABA Committee on the Code
of Judicial Conduct, explained the change of language:
The Committee was confronted, however, by the interpretations
of many able judges and law professors that [the proposed revisions] would require a judge to disqualify himself if he had a
fixed belief about the law applicable to a given case . . . . This
. . . was not intended; indeed, the Committee recognized the ne-

cessity and the value of judges having fixed beliefs about constitutional principles and many other facets of the law. 9
Thus, under the present rule, while personal bias or prejudice requires
11J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 413 (1950)(quoting from his opinion in In re J.P. Linahan
& Co., 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943)).
11 2 K. DAVIS,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

§ 12.01, at 131 (1958)(emphasis added). In

this regard see Tuttle v. Tuttle, 46 N.D. 79, 181 N.W. 888 (1921): "the mere fact that a
judge entertains, or even has expressed, an opinion upon some question of law does not
disqualify him on the ground of bias or prejudice." Id. at 91, 181 N.W. at 908. See also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 147, 1061-62 (5th ed. 1979)(where "bias" and "prejudice" are defined as "used in law regarding disqualification of judge, refers to mental attitude or disposition of the judge toward a party to the litigation, and not to any views that he may entertain regarding the subject matter involved").
" Note, Justice Rehnquist's Decision to Participatein Laird v. Tatum, 73 COLUM. L.
REV. 106, 113 (1973)(quoting the Reporter's Notes to the Code of Judicial Conduct (unpublished at 34)).
". Id. at 113-14 (citing the Reporter's Notes at 35). See W. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO

(1973).
supra note 38, at 61, quoted in 13A C.WRIGHT, A.MILLER & E. COOPER, FED-

THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

89 THODE,

ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES § 3542, at 570-71 (2d ed. 1984).
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disqualification a fixed belief concerning a principle of law does not.4 0

And surely you must take as authoritative the declaration by the Supreme Court itself on this matter:
[no] . . . decision of this Court would require us to hold that it
would be a violation of procedural due process for a judge to sit in
a case after he had expressed an opinion4 as to whether certain
types of conduct were prohibited by law. 1
My other point about a judge's right, if not a duty, to have a view as to
"what the law is," is that our legal system is premised on courts applying
the law that exists (absent a good reason to do otherwise). Requiring that
each judge approach a case without a fixed opinion regarding the law is
contrary to the concept of law itself; or at least it clashes directly with the
central common-law doctrine of stare-decisis, requiring judges ordinarily
to apply today what yesterday they or their predecessors declared to be
the law. Thus, a prejudgment regarding the law is a positive attribute."
As one writer noted: "the adjudicator who has given much thought and
study to a particular legal problem, and has thereby at least partially
prejudged the issues involved, would seem to be preferred to the judge
who has not developed the basis for a prejudgment."4
More recently, Justice Rehnquist declined to recuse himself from a case
raising issues identical to those on which he had expressed his views "as
an expert witness for the Justice Department on the subject of statutory
and constitutional law"44 in testimony before a Senate Subcommittee.
Concededly, he had "expressed an understanding of the law . . . which

was contrary to the contentions of respondents in [the case presently
before him]."' Justice Rehnquist asserted reasons why a Justice should
not be disqualified from sitting in a case raising a particular legal question on which he had expressed "a public view
[prior to assuming the
46
Bench] as to what the law is or ought to be."

On the propriety of participating in such a case, Justice Rehnquist
declared:
40 Note, supra note 37, at 114. See generally Note, Disqualificationof Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARv. L. REV. 736, 757-58, nn. 91-94 (1973).
11 F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702-03 (1948). The Cement Institute opinion is discussed infra at the text accompanying notes 77-85.
11 3 K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19.2 (2d ed. 1980)("A judge may have a

bias [prejudice] on a question of law because he decided the question in a previous judicial
opinion; the judge who has the most biases in this sense may be the best judge." Id. at 375.)
Comment, Prejudice and the Administrative Process, 59 Nw. U. L. REv7216, 219 n.9
(1964).
44 Memorandum of Justice Rehnquist, Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 825-26 (1972).
4

48 Id. at 826.
46 Id at 830. See

also id. at 831-39 where Justice Rehnquist described other situations in
which Justices had publicly expressed views on legal issues and thereafter participated in
the Court's resolution of such issues.
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Since most Justices come to this bench no earlier than their middle years, it would be unusual if they had not, by that time formulated at least some tentative notions that would influence
them in their interpretation of the sweeping clauses of the Constitution and their interaction with one another. It would be not
merely unusual, but extraordinary, if they had not at least given
opinions as to constitutional issues in their previous legal careers.
Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was
a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutionaladjudication
would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.""
It still looks to me as if Justice White and some of
the others were merely giving the parties' counsel an opportunity to say a
few final words before their arguments were rejected.
NAIVE OBSERVER:

LEARNED

LAWYER:

Well, perhaps three years of law school will

straighten you out about this. Come back after you have earned your
J.D.; if you still have problems we will continue our discussion.
Three years and a bar examination later.
RECENT LAW SCHOOL GRADUATE (FORMER NAIVE OBSERVER):

Frankly,

we didn't spend much time on this in law school, and it wasn't even
among those inexcusably obscure questions inevitably included on the bar
examination, so maybe that's why Justice White's concurrence in Gates
still seems improper. I realize that nothing in federal law 8 or the ABA

" Id. at 835 (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist asserted, in terms of propriety (not
disqualification), that for a nominee to the bench (unlike a citizen who makes statements
prior to nomination)
to express any but the most general observations about the law would suggest

that, in order to obtain favorable consideration of his nomination, he deliberately
was announcing in advance, without benefit of judicial oaths, briefs, or arguments,
how he would decide a particular question that might come before him as a judge.
Id. at 836 n.5. Justice Rehnquist seems to be saying that it is unethical to appear to be
currying favor. His statement also implies, however, the perceived unethicality of prejudicial
proclamation on particular legal issues that might later come before the witness as judge.
4 The federal statutes that directly relate to judicial ethics are few. See generally 28
U.S.C. §§ 47, 144 and 455 (1982). Recusal of a Supreme Court Justices is legally governed
principally by 28 U.S.C. § 455, which provides:
Any Justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in
which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a material
witness, or is so related or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it
improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding
therein.
Disqualification is "mandatory" for the categories of "substantial interest," prior "material
witness," and "has been of counsel." Rehnquist Memorandum, 409 U.S. at 828-29; see also
28 U.S.C. § 455(e). "Substantial interest" is usually interpreted to mean a pecuniary or
other beneficial interest. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bell, 351 F.2d 868, 878 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 947 (1966). But see Adams v. U.S., 302 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1962): "The interest
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Code of Judicial Conduct"9 directly prohibits any sort of statement from
the bench by a judge regarding his or her views about the law.
Nevertheless, I'm sure you realize that certain related matters have not
been without controversy over the years. I refer to extra-judicial statements by members of the Supreme Court.50 Although Justices have been
making extra-judicial statements about the law since the Court's early
years, judges and commentators have expressed disapproval of the practice. For example, Justice Frankfurter declared at a Harvard Law School
banquet (in response to a request to comment about an article about the
Supreme Court): "I do not want to talk about any matters connected with
the Supreme Court."'" At the same proceeding he said:
I do not think that any member of the Supreme Court should talk
about contemporaneous decisions. Because of the nature of the
adversary process, an adjudication should be made on the basis of
arguments to come before the Court in a particular case. And
comments by a member of the Court on these opinions, in public
or in private, of what an opinion may mean are, from my point of
view, hostile to the full play of the adversary process."
One of the more austere versions of this ethical principle was expressed
by Justice Cardozo, who explained: "[A] member of the Supreme Court
must lay upon himself a self-denying ordinance. ' ' ss On the same subject
Justice Cardozo said, in a letter to a cousin declining a request to speak
to her organization:
You have no idea of the inhibitions that hedge the soul-the pure
undefiled soul-of a Justice of the Supreme Court. He may not
talk about events of the day. They may indicate his judgment as
to problems that may come before him as a judge! He may not
talk about the past. The past is the parent of the present and has
given it its shape and mold! He may not talk about the future.
The future is what we make of it, and is here almost as we speak.
Well, the result is that I don't make speeches anywhere-not
even at bar associations."'
Moreover, it is the common practice of candidates and nominees for
federal judgeships to decline to give specific views regarding issues of law
that might come before the Court. Justice O'Connor, for example, in her
that any lawyer has in pushing his case to a successful conclusion." Id. at 310.
" See infra text accompanying notes 64-69.
" See Westin, supra note 1.
" PROCEEDINGS IN HONOR OF MR. JusTicE FRANKFURTER 10 (Harvard Law School Occasional Pamphlet No. 2; 1960), quoted in Westin, supra note 1, at 634.
Id. at 11, quoted in Westin, supra note 1, at 660.
" G. HELLMAN, supra note 1, at 271.
Id. at 292.
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confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, declined to
indicate her probable vote on particular issues of law that might be
presented to the Court. In response to questions soliciting her views on
Roe v.Wade,55 for example, she testified: "I do not believe that, as a
nominee, I can tell you how I might vote on a particular issue which may
come before the Court."56 She said also that she would not endorse or
criticize earlier decisions, because they might again come up to the
7
5

Court.

While Justice O'Connor did express the general view that some "examples of the application of the [exclusionary] . . .rule [were] . . .unfortu-

nate," and perhaps by negative inference suggested her notions as to the
appropriate applications of the rule,5 "she emphasized that she was
therein expressing her personal views [and that they] have no place in the
resolution of legal issues."' 0 She also steadfastly declined to comment on
particular cases.60
A recent issue of the American Bar Association Journal 1 discusses the
procedures employed by some members of the Senate Judiciary Committee (including sending an eight page questionnaire to the candidate) for
determining the constitutional philosophy of potential nominees to the
federal judiciary. Relating the experience of a particular candidate, Joseph Rodriguez, the Journal states that he "repeatedly stressed that it
would be inappropriatefor him to comment on issues that might come
before him as a federal judge."62 Rodriguez wrote, in response to a question about Roe v. Wade: "[T]here could also be a more serious appearance of impropriety if it seems that I have pledged to take a particular
view of the law. . . [ajn essential ingredient of justice is the appearance
of justice. The called-for response could affect that appearance. "63
Moreover, the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct suggests that the ethical
aspiration of appearance of "impartiality" may apply to pre-judgment of
legal issues as well as evidentiary disputes, notwithstanding a judge's understandable possession of a jurisprudential value system and even fairly
definite views on particular legal questions. For the Code states that a
judge may not obtain the advice of a legal expert unless "[the judge] gives
notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

8

Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 11, 1981, at 3 (reporting the testimony given September 9, 1981).
*1 Id. at 7.
08 Id. at 8.
6

59

Id.

60

Id.

'

71 A.B.A.J. 60 (Aug. 1985).
Id. at 64 (emphasis added).

11 Id. (emphasis added)
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advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond."" This
tells us, does it not, that the same ethics codifiers who found no fault in
judges who approached litigation with "fixed belief[s] about the law applicable to a given case" at least recognized that adjudicativeresponsibilities include responsibilities to resolve issues of law?65 Furthermore,
under Canon Five, a judge may "write, lecture, teach and speak on nonlegal subjects," as long as "such avocational activities do not detract from
the dignity of his office or interfere with the performance of his judicial
duties." 6 Under Canon Four, a judge may "speak, write, lecture, teach,
and participate in other activities concerning the law, the legal system,
and the administration of justice 6' 7 only if consistent with two constraints: 1) "in doing so he does not cast doubt on his capacity to decide
impartially any issue that may come before him,"" and 2) the limitations
of Canon Five.69 Since issues that "may come before" a judge includes
issues of law, the Code seems to recognize and disapprove of the possibility of pre-adjudication utterances that render a judge improperly partial
on matters of law!
LEARNED LAWYER:
observation?

May I interrupt this disquisition with a small

RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

How small?

Just to disabuse you of some dubious legal reasonLEARNED LAWYER:
ing in your very last point: to read the impartiality requirement of Canon
4A as going beyond prevention of fact-partiality, person-partiality or outcome-partiality (from corrupt motives), is to commit the sin of begging
the question.
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

While it is possible to read these vague and

noble phrases, lines which at once invite and reveal question-begging, as
consistent with only a narrow notion of "partiality"-i.e., one that refers
only to adjudicative facts, or to a pre-existing bias for or against parties,
witnesses or attorneys-it seems just as reasonable to conclude that the
drafters of these provisions at least contemplated a duty of "impartiality"
that could be improperly compromised by a judge's extra-judicial statements about the law.
LEARNED LAWYER:

You'll have to be more persuasive than that. For

one thing, if extra-judicial statements about the law are unethical a great

CODE Canon 3(A)(4).
65 And to resolve them, at least, by providing the parties a fair opportunity to address
any outside influence regarding the legal issue in question.
"6 CODE Canon 5.
17 Id. at Canon 4(A).
"

" Id. at Canon 4.

"*Id. at Canon 4 (Commentary).
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number of Justices throughout the years have misbehaved.7" Certainly
Justice Cardozo's precepts on this matter were far more austere than the
attitudes of all but the most rigidly "ethical" judges.
Just six years ago, more than half of the Court's members took to the
lecture circuit,7' explaining to all who would listen each Justice's views
regarding a controversial decision72 -one that some observers read as forbidding the press from attending criminal trials where the trial judge declared that allowing the press access would jeopardize the fairness of the
trial.73
Why, the present Chief Justice himself declared, shortly after being
confirmed, that: "All the talk of outside activities is totally irrelevant to
the administration
of justice. Far from withdrawing I intend to accelerate
7' 4
my activities.

More important, young counsellor, the situations you refer to are so
obviously distinguishable that I wonder how you managed to persuade
those law professors to hand you a diploma. Justice White did not express
his views in advance of judicial proceedings but in the course of judicial
proceedings! We are speaking not of extra-judicial statements, but of judicial statements!
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

LEARNED LAWYER:

WHAT? You'd better explain yourself.

RECENT LAW GRADUATE:
LEARNED LAWYER:

Judicial but not judicious.

Yes, I do think your distinction is important.

All right then.

It is important because gratuitous declarations of law, accompanied by comprehensive elaborationof reasons (with
ostensible documentation), expounded from the Bench, regardinga legal
issue that is pending or impending is probably more questionable than
most extra-judicial statements in terms of a Justice's proper functioning in the case to come. Extra-judicial statements are rarely as compreRECENT LAW GRADUATE:

" See generally Westin, supra note 1.
" Carellig, Associated Press, Sept. 7, 1979, AM Cycle, Washington Dateline.
" The case being "explained" was Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979),

where the Court, in a 5-4 decision, stated that "members of the public have no constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to attend criminal trials." Id. at
391. The case involved a trial court's exclusion, with the consent of the attorneys, of the
press from a pre-trial hearing.
11 In the following Term, the Court upheld, under the first amendment, the right of the
public and the press to attend criminal trials. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555 (1980).
14 N.Y. Times, July 2, 1969, at 1, col. 7. For a comprehensive and insightful analysis of
Chief Justice Burger's understanding of his role as chief administrator of the Courts of the
United States see Landever, Chief Justice Burger and Extra-Case Activism, 20 J. PUB. L.
523, 525-31 (1971).
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hensive, as elaborate, or as unequivocal and conclusive in tone and temper as Justice White's Gates concurrence. Extra-judicial declarations
rarely lock a Justice in as much as the type of declaration Justice White
made in Gates. And thus, they rarely present to the party and to the
public in a later case a so-called hearing that is nothing more than a charade-a foregone conclusion with regard to the supposed "open-mindedness" of one or more Justices.
The problem for Mr. Leon and Mr. Sheppard was arguably greater
than it would have been had Justice White made these statements at a
Bar Association function, or even in a law review article.
LEARNED LAWYER:

I don't understand.

RECENT LAW GRADUDATE:
So far as Justice White's probable vote was
concerned, because the Gates concurrence was an official pronouncement
from the bench, that thirteen-month-old opinion probably had an impact
on him akin to the force of law.
A public statement, from any forum or platform, unlike unexpressed
views, is, and operates as, a commitment to an outcome. It operates as a
commitment in that it is difficult to retract without public embarrassment. It operates also as a mind-set, a psychological locking-in of reasoning processes and conclusions.7" It is also a commitment to self that has a
very strong tendency to be self-enforcing, without necessary awareness of
that commitment as a motivating factor of the later decision. Indeed, I
would not at all be surprised to find, somewhere in the literature of experimental psychology, that writing one's reasons down tends to fix them
in one's mind as well as on one's writing paper. And on the least subtle
level, consistency is presumably of great importance to a judge, particularly with regard to a declaration he uttered from the bench just thirteen
months earlier.
Moreover, there is an important sense in which such a declaration is
not "responsible." A Justice who writes a gratuitous concurrence is not
immediately responsible for any consequences, for it rarely has immediate
consequences. It makes little or no difference to the parties,7 6 and
scarcely, if at all, effects controlling legal doctrine. When the expression

"6See

D. WICKENS AND D. MEYER, PSYCHOLOGY 276-85 (1961). See also E. TOLMAN, PuRBEHAVIOR IN ANIMALS AND MEN (1932): "[Oince set up, a system [set] probably does
as much harm as it does good. It serves as a sort of sacred grating behind which each novice
is commanded to kneel in order that he may never see the real world save through its interstices." Id. at 394. See also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) where Justice Frankfurter
PosIV

stated, "[ijt has not been unknown that judges persist in error to avoid giving the appear-

ance of weakness and vacillation." Id. at 392.
7' Admittedly a party may receive additional psychological satisfaction, beyond a vic-

tory, from a concurring Justice's assertion of a particular reading of the law or from his
declared preference for an even more favorable disposition. The satisfaction does not seem
comparable in magnitude to the sense of futility and the feeling of manifest injustice generated in parties who are told that the game is lost before the players take the field.
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of words and ideas is detached from any manifest consequences, the author may not write with an appropriate sense of ethical weightiness.
Words come easily, and tend to be less deliberated when they do not obviously and immediately effectuate significant results. Yet those words,
unencumbered by the constraints of immediate impact, can, as I've submitted, ultimately play a profoundly important role in the resolution of
prudential and substantive issues subsequently confronting the authorlater-to-become-decision-maker.
So the fact that a declaration of law was uttered from the bench, far
from sanctifying it, significantly aggravates the probability that the author of the pre-decisional opinion will have an investment in his or her
public stand and increases the likelihood that the parties will perceive,
usually correctly, that regarding at least one Justice, the law, (which is at
its weakest strength no less than an open subject for judicial consideration, and at its core presumed to be dictated by precedent), is closed by
that Justice's pre-judgment--and here a prejudgment that controlling
precedent is not to control!
At the later "hearing" (including consideration of briefs) can we expect
the pre-judging Justice to hear any sounds other than the "reverberating
clang" of his own recent, public, and conclusive pronouncement?
LEARNED LAWYER:

Whatever the theoretical validity of your points,

which I do not concede in any event, don't you think that the Supreme
Court rejected, once and for all, the notion of such an animal as "improper law-partiality" in the Cement Institute case? Your earlier response to my reference to that decision evaded that case's central
teaching.
The Court was reviewing a circuit court opinion that had set aside an
FTC cease and desist order against the Cement Institute, consisting of
seventy-four corporations in the cement industry. The Institute had been
charged with violating the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act by restraining trade through the employment of a multiple basing
point pricing system.77 The Portland Cement industry had asked the
Commission to disqualify itself because several members of the Commission had issued reports to, and testified before, congressional committees,
to the effect that, in their opinion, "the multiple basing point system as
they had studied it was the equivalent of a price fixing restraint of trade
in violation of the Sherman Act. 7' 8 The Supreme Court decided this issue
"on the assumption that such an opinion had been formed by the entire
membership of the Commission as a result of its prior official
investigations."Is

" 333 U.S. 683, 688-89.
78

Id. at 700.

79 Id.
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The Court found that "this belief did not disqualify the Commission.""0
The fact that the Commission had first entertained such views as the result of its ex parte investigations did not mean, according to the Court,
that when the Commission later held hearings at which the industry had
a chance to present its case "the minds of [the Commission's] members
were irrevocably closed on the subject of the respondents' basing point
practices." 81
Interestingly, the Court observed that
[i]f the Commission's opinions expressed in congressionally required reports would bar its members from acting in unfair trade
proceedings, it would appear that opinions expressed in the first
basing point unfair trade proceeding would similarly disqualify
them from ever passing on another . . . . Thus experience acquired from their work as Commissioners would be a handicap
instead of an advantage. Such was not the intendment of
Congress. 2
Finally, as I tried to point out earlier, the Court stated in no uncertain
terms that it would not be a violation of procedural due process for a
judge to sit in a case after he had expressed an opinion as to whether
certain types of conduct were prohibited by law. 8 3 The Court said "[iun
fact, judges frequently try the same case more than once and decide identical issues each time, although these issues involve questions both of law
and fact. Certainly, the Federal Trade Commission cannot possibly be
'
under stronger constitutional compulsion in this respect than a court."84
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

Admittedly, it would seem that the spirit of

the case is antithetical to my questioning of an adjudicator's right to have
and express opinions about the law-indeed, even about the law as applied to certain facts not yet before the tribunal.
Nonetheless, your assertion of the Cement Institute case essentially
defeats an argument I did not advance. I speak not of "due process of
law," but of a prudential admonition that a Justice promulgate and apply
a "self-denying ordinance."
Examine the Cement Institute case more closely, if you will. It is of
some significance that the Court did not overlook the fact that the Commission was "making studies and filing reports in obedience to congressional command."86 Of more importance, the Commission was presumed
to be acting as a whole. And, in forming their pre-adjudication views, they

Id.
Id. at 701.
'
"

"

Id.
Id.
I'
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

702 (citations omitted).
702-03.
703.
701 (emphasis added).
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were fulfilling their institutional mission by acquiring the expertise Congress expects of administrative agencies.
Courts are performing their role when they advance the understanding
or development of law as they (the majority of judges or Justices whose
views dictated the outcome) explain the results they decree; that is,
render an authoritative explanation of the law as it is explicated.
Justices speaking outside the majority do not advance the development
of the law: their views bind no successors to the particularseat on the
bench, let alone later majorities.
Look. You are challenging what is part and parcel
of the judicial process- i.e., the right of a judge to state his or her views,
to provide an explanation for his or her vote. By the time Leon came
before the Court three other Justices had expressed their views from the
bench on the question in opinions that were not part of the "the law" in
the sense that the Justices' vote in those cases was not necessary for a
majority and the Justices' opinions proposing an exception to the exclusionary rule were not necessary to produce a holding.8 6 This practice is
common enough to cause me to hesitate to attest to your qualifications
when down the road you apply for membership in the bar of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
LEARNED LAWYER:

I suppose that is one way to settle an argument.17 But where is it written that what would be an impropriety off the
bench is always and necessarily justifiable when done from the bench?
The matters of how and when a Justice exercises his or her powers in
electing to write an opinion on a question should be no more immune
from ethical criticism than any other judicial behavior that might unfairly
harm vital interests of litigants and of the law.
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

LEARNED LAWYER:

Your "unfairly" begs the question.
Criticism accepted, in part. Ultimately, one's

RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

view of the "unfairness" of law-partiality turns on one's concept of a
court as adjudicator and one's views on whether the propriety of a Justice's gratuitously addressing and declaring himself or herself on any legal

" See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976)(White, J.,dissenting); Stone, 428 U.S.
at 501 (Burger, C.J., concurring); States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)(Rehnquist, J.);
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611-12 (1975)(Powell, J., concurring). See also California v.
Minjares, 443 U.S. 916 (1979)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denail of stay); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 261-71 (1983)(Powell, J., concurring).
"8 See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 48 (1980) wherein the author, under the section

entitled "Natural Law," offers the following quotation:
"Well, what may seem like the truth to you," said the seventeen-year old bus
driver and part-time philosopher, "may not, of course, seem like the truth to the
other fella, you know."
THEN THE OTHER FELLOW IS WRONG, IDIOT!"

P.

ROTH,

THE

GREAT AMERICAN

NOVEL 19 (1973).
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question in any manner is beyond legitimate question.
The late Professor Alexander Bickel, a towering scholar of the Court,
wrote (commenting on the Warren Court) that:
[Regarding] [t]he criticism of the Court that [it] . . . is too political. . . . If it means that the Court should make no decisions that
can in any sense be deemed political, but should follow some certain body of rules called Constitutional Law, the answer is that
The Law as so conceived is a myth, it does not exist, and hence
the Court, in order to function at all, must make law rather than
simply follow it. Therefore, it must make what are bound to be, in
a sense, political decisions.
But if the criticism means that the Court's occasions and
modes of policymaking should be different from those of the
elected organs of government, then the criticisms is well-taken. It
means, then, not that this has been a political court but that it
has in some instances been wrongly political, that it has been political after the fashion of a legislature or an executive rather
than a court.88
In making oral argument in Gideon v. Wainwright,a8 attorney Abe Fortas eloquently conveyed to the Court his conception of what is minimally
central to the idea of a "trial." While the essential components of Justice
Fortas' idea of a fair trial are not directly relevant to the problem before
us, his approach to the problem is compelling-locate the deepest and
most commonly held understandingof the fundamental attributes of a
court functioning as court. It will guide a jurist toward the correct determination of what is minimally necessary to at least approximate justice under our adversary system. Thus, in contending that a fair criminal
trial required legal representation of the defendant, as well as the state,
Mr. Fortas said to the Justices:
A criminal court is not properly constituted. . . under our adversary system of law, unless there is a judge, and unless there is a
counsel for the prosecution, and unless there is a counsel for the
defense. Without that, how can a civilized nation pretend that it
is having a fair trial, under our adversary system, which means
that counsel for the state will do his best, within the limits of
fairness and honor and decency, to present the case for the state,
and counsel for the defense will do his best, similarly, to present
the best case possible for the defendant and from that clash there
- will emerge the truth.

Bickel, Is the Warren Court Too "Political?" N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1966 (Magazine)
at 130 (emphasis added).

80372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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That is our concept. And how can we say, how can it be suggested that a court is properly constituted, that a trial is fair, unless those conditions exist?9"
Is not a distinguishing mark of the judicial process, even of an activist
judicial process, the resolution of adverse contentions regarding factual
and legal issues, such resolution being reached only after such contentions are urged upon the Court by the opposing parties or their counsel?
In other words, is not one of the minimal attributes of a court acting, in
Professor Bickel's words, "after the fashion of a

. .

.court" the disinter-

ested "hearing"'" of arguments from the parties at risk of judgment prior
to final resolution of the controversy? A court that renders a ruling
resolving a real, concrete controversy between honestly contending parties, without having received proof of fact or arguments of law from the
parties or their attorneys, and having the capacity and willingness to
fairly "listen" to the contentions, would be blatantly treating the dispute
as an occasion or opportunity to make or apply law, and the participants
as incidental to the Justices' ideological or doctrinal agenda.
LEARNED LAWYER:

Hold your argument right there. Since you now

have made clear that your contention depends on the existence of the
right to a hearing before the Supreme Court, I can see how your benighted state of confusion can be cured.
You should know, first, that no one has a right to a hearing in the
United States Supreme Court: for one thing, whether or not the Court
accepts a case for review (whether before it on certiorari or on appeal) is,
in actuality, if not clearly in law, almost entirely a matter for its discretion. 2 For another, the Court not infrequently decides cases without even
receiving briefs or hearing oral arguments from the parties.93 And the
Justices have decided
quite a few cases on points of law not even raised in
94
the arguments.

As the same Professor Bickel you've quoted once opined, unlike
courts of general jurisdiction which sit as primary agencies for the
peaceful settlement of disputes, and, in a more restricted sphere,
as primary agencies for the vindication and evolution of the legal
order . .

.

.[and] must

.

.

resolve all controversies within their

jurisdiction because the alternative is chaos, [the Supreme
Court's role] is not primarily to settle disputes between parties,

1057

LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 615 (P. Kurland and G. Casper 1975).
91 See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
" One of the most consequential decisions was Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see
the discussion infra notes 103-13 and the accompanying text.
"
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but to render an additional, principled judgment on what has
already been authoritatively ordered. Its interventions are by hypothesis exceptional and limited, and they occur, not to forestall
chaos, but to revise a pre-existing order that is otherwise viable
and was itself arrived at through normal procedures. Fixation on
an individual's right to judgment by the Supreme Court is,
therefore, largely question-beggingf5
Yes, of course I realize that no party has a
right to have its case reviewed by the Supreme Court. Even when cases
reach the Court through the process of "appeal"' rather than certiorari,
the Court sometimes disposes summarily-i.e., without either oral argument or plenary briefing-of appeals which meet jurisdictional requirements, and also dismisses some certiorari petitions which have been
granted. Nevertheless, where the Court does undertake to decide the case
on the merits,9 7 scholars"" and some Justices," have argued, persuasively,
I submit, that the Court is obliged to afford a "hearing" (in the sense of
receiving at least written, if not oral, arguments' 00 on the merits of the
controversy).
While my case against Justices unnecessarily rendering themselves
"law-partial" regarding a major revision of legal or constitutional doctrine
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

95A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 173 (1962) (emphasis added).
" See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 317-27 (discussing appeals),
362-68 (discussing writs of certiorari)(5th ed. 1978).
17 Summary disposition of "appeals" are "on the merits." Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.
332, 343-45 (1975). The precedential value of such summary dispositions is unusual: they
bind lower courts but not the Supreme Court. See STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 96, at
327-36; see, e.g. Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 74 (1976). This suggests a partial recognition that a case only partially argued and only inattentively "heard" is a case not strong or
credible enough to be given the full weight of a precedent that binds the Supreme Court.
What is of interest to the present thesis, however, is the summary nature of the decision.
Oral arguments are not heard and briefing of the issues is less than plenary. While the
present thesis deals with the right to law-impartial Justices regarding any aspect of adjudication, it also suggests-though the thesis is not dependent on it-that it is a matter of
questionable fairness to dispose of a case without permitting the parties to present
arguments.
11 See Brown, Forward:Process of Law, 72 HARV. L. REV. 77, 82-93 (1958); see also Comment, Per Curiam Decisions of the Supreme Court: 1957 Term, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 28284 (1959), and compare with The Supreme Court: 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40, 92-99
(1961).
99 See, Brennan, State Court Decisions and the Supreme Court, 31 PENN. BAR ASSN. Q.
393, 403 (1960); see also Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957), where
Justice Harlan commented that a reversal on a petition of certiorari "without the benefit of
an opposing brief or oral argument can scarely be regarded as a precedent of much significance." Id. at 379, n.8 (Harlan, J. dissenting); Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 52 (1982)("I
cannot. . . agree that summary reversal is proper in a case that involves a significant issue
not settled by our prior decisions.")(Marshall, J., dissenting); Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S.
111, 121 (1983)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
'a See Brown, supra note 98, at 94.
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hovering on the horizon (e.g., at issue in a pending or impending case)
does not rest on the notion that there is a right to a hearing, surely there
is much to be said, consistent with, and supportive of, my thesis for recognizing such a right, when a case is to be decided on the merits-that is,
when parties before the Court are "at risk of judgment":
[Slummary reversal on certiorari papers appears in many cases to
raise serious question whether there has not been decision without that hearing usually thought due from judicial tribunals.
Anguished or indignant complaints to that effect in fruitless petitions for rehearing (as they are formally styled) seem not without
justification.10 1
[I]f the Court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction to deal with
issues of national significance, almost by definition those issues
warrant, if they do not require, more than summary consideration. If the Court chooses to exercise a more individualized function with respect to selected cases, it is not thereby relieved of
and
following procedures which provide both fairness to litigants
10 2
conditions conducive to informed and considered decision.
It is, I submit, a valid, and, in the present context, ironic, criticism of
Mapp v. Ohio,' that the decision, holding that the states were bound to
apply the Weeks exclusionary rule,'0 4 thus overruling the then twelve
year old decision in Wolf v. Colorado,'05 was rendered without benefit of

121

Id.

at 80.

[Does not) the Court . . . pay a disproportionate price in public regard when it
defeats counsel's reasonable expectation of a hearing, based upon the Court's own

rules. If the Court exercises its certiorari jurisdiction to deal with problems of
national legal significance, it hardly needs demonstration that such matters war-

rant hearing on the merits. If the Court chooses to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to act as a Court of Selected Error, there is still the matter of a fair and
adequate procedure to determine when error exists. If summary decision on the
merits is warranted, the category of cases in which it is appropriate must not be

much broader than those in which the decision below is "clearly erroneous."
Id. at 82.
10 Id. at 94.
os 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The story of the transformation of the Mapp case from a first
amendment problem to the Court's profoundly new understanding of the meaning of fourth
amendment rights in state courts is dramatically related in MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
118-44(R. Cortner & E. Lytle, ed. 1971).
"o Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)(holding that evidence seized by federal

law enforcement agents in violation of the fourth amendment could not be admitted into
evidence in a criminal prosecution of a defendant who was victimized by the invalid search
and seizure).
10 338 U.S. 25 (1949)(holding that although state law enforcement officers were bound

by the behavioral restrictions of the fourth amendment, the federal Constitution did not
require state courts to exclude evidence obtained by state officers in violation of the fourth
amendment).
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either briefs or oral arguments on the issue from the parties' (who had
primarily briefed the issue of the validity of the obscenity statute under
10 7

which Ms. Mapp had been convicted).

The parties had not urged the overruling of Wolf or the application of
the Weeks exclusionary rule to evidence proferred in state courts obtained by unconstitutional searches and seizures.108 Indeed, during oral

I" The American Civil Liberties Union and its Ohio affiliate joined in a brief amicus
curiae in the U.S. Supreme Court. The brief primarily attacked the statute under the first
amendment and the right to privacy, and the statutory classifications and exemptions as
violative of the equal protection clause. The applicability of the Weeks exclusionary rule
was mentioned only in the following concluding paragraph:
This case presents the issue of whether evidence obtained in an illegal search and
seizure can constitutionally be used in State criminal proceedings. We are aware
of the view that this Court has taken on this issue in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25. It is our purpose by this paragraph to respectfully request that this Court reexamine this issue and conclude that the ordered liberty concept guaranteed to
persons by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily requires that evidence illegally obtained in violation thereof not be admissible in
state criminal proceedings.
Brief Amici Curiae on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union and Ohio Civil Liberties
Union at 20, Mapp.
The brief for the State of Ohio did mention Wolf, but simply by way of ruling out the
relevance of defendant's assertion that a proper search warrant had not been secured. The
state's brief could not conceivably be said to have adequately addressed the issue of whether
Wolf should be reconsidered. See Brief of Appellee on the Merits at 10, Mapp.
An even more egregious example of the Court deciding and opining arguably in disregard
of its inherent institutional obligations was Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). In
that case, the Court rendered a 6-3 summary reversal, sans full briefing or oral arguments
on the merits of significant issues regarding a) the rights of a former CIA employee to publish a book about intelligence operations, without complying with the terms of an employment agreement requiring submission of manuscripts for prepublication clearance by the
CIA, and b) the remedies available to the Agency where an employee violates the terms of
his agreement. Holding that punitive damages were an inappropriate and inadequate remedy, the Court imposed a constructive trust on Mr. Snepp's profits from his book.
The issue of remedy was raised however, only in the cross-petition by the Justice Department for certiorari, filed in order "to bring the entire case up in the event the Court granted
Snepp's certiorari petition." G. GUNTHER, INDIVIDuAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 113637 n.3 (3d ed. 1981).
Justice Stevens (joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall) objected to the
Court's extraordinary procedure, asserting that "certiorari having been granted, the issue
surely should not be resolved in the absence of full briefing and argument." 444 U.S. at 511
(1980)(emphasis added).
107The Ohio Supreme Court found the obscenity statute invalid because of its impact on
freedom of speech and press. State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 432-33, 166 N.E.2d 387, 39091 (1960). However, under the OHIO CONsT. art. IV, § 2 an Ohio law cannot be found unconstitutional unless at least all but one Ohio Supreme Court Justice concur, or the Ohio Supreme Court is affirming a court of appeals. Accordingly, Ms. Mapp's conviction was affirmed, notwithstanding a 4-3 vote for invalidating the statute. Id. at 434, 166 N.E.2d at
391.
...Ms. Mapp's attorneys argued, aside from the constitutional invalidity of the Ohio obscenity statute, that the search and seizure was so shocking as to require exclusion of the
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argument, counsel for Ms. Mapp was asked by the Court whether he
sought reversal of Wolf v. Colorado. He disavowed any intent to seek reversal of Wolf and adhered to the contentions in his brief,' 9 contentions
that sought to bring the conduct of the police within the Rochin
doctrine." 0
The Attorney-General of Ohio, in his petition for rehearing, protested
the unfairness of losing both the case and an issue of profound consequence to the future of state law enforcement without having been given
a meaningful opportunity to address the Court on the matter: "The
judgment imposing for the first time the Weeks federal exclusionary rule
upon the States, is a judgment that has been rendered without affording
the appellee a fair and full opportunity to be heard.""'
In the Mapp decision itself, Justice Harlan, dissenting in an opinion
joined by Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker, objected to the majority
having "reached out" to overrule Wolf, and pointed out that the validity
of the obscenity statute "was the principal issue which was decided by
the Ohio Supreme Court, which was tendered by appellant's Jurisdictional Statement, and which was briefed and argued in this Court."112
In a note to Justice Clark (the author of the Mapp majority), Justice
Stewart, who ultimately voted with the majority for reversal of the obscenity conviction, expressed "surprise" at the proposed opinion and
urged that "[ilf Wolf is to be reconsidered, I myself would much prefer to
do so only in a case that required it, and only after argument of the case
by competent counsel and a full Conference discussion."'
Thus the historic holding that the exclusionary rule must be followed
by the states was ethically flawed, whatever its doctrinal merits or demerits. And, I submit, United States v. Leon, the case establishing the first
major departure from Mapp, was also tainted by a related distortion of
adjudicative processes, a distortion in the form of the Gates concurrence.
You seem to have conveniently overlooked the fact
that Justice White's opinion in Gates was informed by adversarial
LEARNED LAWYER:

evidence under the "shock the conscience" test employed in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952). The Ohio Supreme Court found Rochin inapplicable because the evidence had
not been seized "from defendant's person by the use of brutal or offensive physical force
against defendant." 177 Ohio St. at 431, 166 N.E.2d at 389-90.
"1 55

LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1165-66 (P. Kurland and G. Casper 1975).
,o See supra note 108.
"' Petition for Rehearing of the Attorney-General of Ohio, Mapp, as quoted in MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 103, at 140.

1' 367 U.S. at 673-74 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOG-

396, n.21 (1983)(quoting from a memorandum from Potter Stewart to Tom Clark,
May 1, 1961, at 811 (Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of
Texas)(emphasis added).
RAPHY
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processes; the parties in Gates were ordered to, and did, present full
briefing and argumentation of the issue of whether a "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule should be recognized by the Court.
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

Yes. Your point is not without significance.

Yet it is not clear that the issue had the benefit of full (or any) conference consultation among the Justices on the merits in Gates; or that pertinent discernible legislative facts were unchanging; or, for that matter,
that lawyers or parties should be treated as fungible-indeed, a client's
choice of counsel might be influenced by the nature of the anticipated
issue. Furthermore, the fact that the issues were eventually briefed and
argued fully in Gates (at the request of the Court) both explains and supports my contention that Justice White rendered what would or could
have been a full-blown decisional opinion in Gates had the Court not ultimately found the issue improperly before it.
All other things equal, Justice White's prior exposure to adversarial argumentation meant that he approached the Leon adjudication with a
more informed but nevertheless (loudly) pronounced bias. Perhaps this
might weigh against consideration of self-recusal in Leon. But my grievance is with Justice White's decision to write that gratuitous concurrence.
The litigants-Mr. Leon and Mr. Sheppard-were still faced with a Justice, who, far from being neutral and detached, had, just nineteen days
before voting to listen to their arguments, unequivocally committed himself not to apply controlling law to the fact situations occurring in their
cases.
In any event, I'm sure you can see the difference between the fact that
no one has a right to be heard and the duty of members of a judicial
tribunal to be impartial where they have afforded the parties the right (or
privilege) of a hearing and thus put them and the nation at a risk of
judgment.
A final iteration of my main point: the issue in Leon was an issue of
law. The purpose of the hearing-i.e., the briefs and the oral arguments-was to resolve the issue of law. Fundamental judicial ethics require that a judge be impartial regarding the matter at issue between the
parties-the matter that he or she is being called upon to decide. A
judge's mind must be open concerning any question that is open and being addressed by the parties. Or, if you find such a proposition untenable
regarding matters of settled law addressed to lower court judges, it is
surely realistic to expect that a Supreme Court Justice has not revealed
his mind to be closed on a question of law that is pending or impending
as an open question before the Court.
Perhaps these prudential precepts are not obvious, and in any event
there may be, indeed there are, justified exceptions to these principles, so
further elaboration is warranted.
That the principle I am asserting is applicable to law-partiality as well
as to fact-partiality is implicit in 28 U.S.C. § 47:
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss4/6
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No judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a
case or issue tried by him.
Characterizing the Supreme Court's approach to this statute, a leading
treatise comments that the Court "has recognized that the purpose of the
statute is to make certain that the reviewing court will be constituted of
judges uncommitted and uninfluenced by having expressed or formed an
opinion in the lower court.""'
Now, since an appeal is not a review of a factual determination, doesn't
this rule reflect some concern that a judge who has declared his view of
the law cannot be impartial in determining the same legal issue in a later
case?" 5 And isn't the problem aggravated when the opinion expresses a
view openly contrary to the extant law?
LEARNED LAWYER:

Are you questioning the sound arguments for dis-

tinguishing between fact-prejudice and law-prejudice advanced by such
legal luminaries as Jerome Frank, Kenneth Culp Davis, and the members
of the American Bar Association Committee who drafted the Code of Judicial Conduct?
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

Justice White's statement in Gates was not a

mere indication of "social attitudes" or of an "attitude," a "preconception," "slant," "point of view" or "unconscious influence" (to recall Judge
Frank's terms). 16 One can readily acknowledge, with Justice Rehnquist,
that a Justice's mind is not, and should not be, a "complete tabula
rasa."'' Of course, Justice Rehnquist made sense in asserting that a
judge is not expected to approach a case with a total absence of preconceptions on the legal issues he or she must decide. But one can and must
accept all that without endorsing the very opposite of it.
Certainly Jerome Frank did not endorse the translation of predilections, preconceptions, or biases into law." 8 He did not urge judges to
hasten to adopt hard preferences, let alone to announce them in advance
of hearings. He spoke of judges having conscious and subconscious leanings toward certain results; trying out the relevant legal material to see if
it fits. If the material did not fit his leanings, a judge who voted his pref-

"' 13A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3545, at
595 (2d ed. 1984)(emphasis added).
"' But see id. at 568 ("Disqualification is not required [under the federal code] because
the judge has definite views as to the law of a particular case." Id.). Nor is disqualification
required under 28 U.S.C. § 144 when a judge has expressed certain views on the general
subject before him, Rosquist v. Soo L. Railroad, 692 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1982), or had
researched the legal issue in advance and was therefore able to make an immediate ruling.
U.S. v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979).
"'
"'

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 133-34 (1935).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985

25

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:707

erence would be either crazy or bad. 1 9
Far from being a statement of his judicial philosophy, his legal values,
his predilections or his tentative, provisional notions about directions the
law should take, Justice White's opinion in Gates regarding the goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule was unequivocal in its declaration
of the existence of an exception to the exclusionary rule. It was a comprehensive, point by point elaboration of his rationale for reading a goodfaith exception into the exclusionary rule in the specific situation where a
magistrate issues a defective search warrant based on an erroneous finding of probable cause, but where the police are not unreasonable in believing that the search was consistent with the dictates of the fourth
amendment. It included virtually all the points he was to make one year
later in Leon-the discussion of the purposes of the exclusionary rule, the
"cost-benefit analysis" 2 ' with ostensible documentation, the purported
refutation of some of the claims contrary to his conclusions (indeed, the
Gates concurrence rested on some points that were omitted from the
Leon opinion), the imposition of the burden of persuasion on the party
advocating retention of the exclusionary rule, citation to virtually all the
same legal and other authorities, and explication of situations involving
search warrants where the exclusionary rule should be retained.
Look again at your distinction between law and fact; it is, I admit, of
some importance in some circumstances. It does not, however, free a
judge to have decided before hearing arguments. Consider: A juror is said
to be the final authority on the facts. The final authority. Nevertheless,
jurors are not free to discuss the facts among themselves before all the
evidence is in-before they have heard the full presentations of both
sides. So even the supreme and final judge of the matter may not determine the matter, in our adjudicatory system, before the adjudicatory process has had a chance to fulfill its mission-to bring to the attention of
the decider the material each adversary believes will persuade the decider
to resolve the matter in dispute in the interests of that adversary. 2 ' The
decider in our adjudicatory system is essentially both passive and neu-

"I Id. at 100-18.
Indeed, this analysis was based in significant part on misleading statistics that were
later clarified in the Brief for 4,eon, at a time, however, when it was too late to change
Justice White's mind (the locked-in phenomenon). See infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
' See Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and
Certain Justice has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 487,
494-96 (1980). The article is an incisive analysis and generally vigorous defense of the
threatened values of the adversary system. Several of those virtues are equally as worthy
reasons for respecting the adversarial qualities of the appellate (law-adjudication) process
(e.g., it promotes "litigant and social acceptance of the decisions rendered by the courts."
Id. at 526). See also Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. L. J. 713 (1983).
120
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tral;' 22 both qualities imply open-mindedness and receptivity. "The adversary system utilizes a neutral decision maker who adjudicates disputes
after they have been aired by the adversaries in a contested proceeding.
This decision maker is expected to suspend judgment until the conclusion
of the contest."' 23 For the same reason that Justices rarely announce during oral arguments that they have made up their minds, they should not
announce their conclusions gratuitously, especially when a case requiring
resolution of the issue is on the horizon.
The argument for not questioning a judge's right to have a pre-judgment about the law is partly based on the idea that challenging pre-adjudication commitment to legal values is challenging "consistent and rational functioning by the judiciary."'12 4 Even if that objective (based
essentially on the recognition that stare decisis itself involves reiteration
and application of previous statements of law) were disserved by a rule
that would demand Justice White's recusal in Leon, the stated objective
has very little bearing on the propriety of his elaborate and gratuitous
advocacy, in Gates, of a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
And I cannot emphasize enough that Justice White was, by his own admission, not explicating extant constitutional doctrine-the law-but
declaring allegiance to a major modification of the authoritativeunderstanding of the operation of the exclusionary rule.
LEARNED

LAWYER:

What you have been saying does indeed trouble me

somewhat-that is, it seems that the received wisdom regarding "law-partiality" is inconsistent with the equally venerable precept that an adjudicator should have an open mind regarding the issue being adjudicated.
Yet, if a judge were open-minded about the law, there would be no law!
Judicial commitment to the law, certainly to articulated pre-existing law,
is at the very heart of the common law tradition. Not only is there no
such thing as judicial prejudice regarding the law: there is also no such
thing as judicial prejudice regarding "legislative facts," 2 5s for those are
part of the law, and, like the law, not a matter for determination by trial.
Doesn't this accepted notion demonstrate that prejudice has to do with
issues to be resolved at an evidentiary hearing-a trial?
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

It seems to me as though you've asserted a

point, not demonstrated it.

122

Landsman, supra note 121, 29 BUFFALO L. REV.at 499-500.

Id. at 490-91.
,21Note, Disqualificationof Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. Rsv.
736, 757 (1973).
"I'The term is used to mean facts not to be resolved by a jury in determining what
transpired between the parties and what relevant mental states the participants possessed,
but rather facts to be utilized by a court in the interpretation and formulation of legal,
statutory or constitutional doctrine. They are facts of the sort presented in a "Brandeis
Brief." See Finer, Psychedelics and Religious Freedom, 19 HASTINGs L.J. 667 (1967).
"2
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Notwithstanding the notion that legislative facts do not concern the
parties12 and "authoritative assertions' 12 7 that the process of finding legislative facts is integral to the judicial law-interpretation function, I see
determination of legislative facts as a process more alien to courts than
the process of interpreting the law as such. The Court sometimes needs
the assistance of contending parties re legislative facts as much as a
factfinder needs adversarial presentations at trial. The Court is notoriously inexpert when it comes to the facts "out there." Thus the high repute of the Brandeis Brief. Indeed, even a Brandeis Brief may be inadequate to fairly determine legislative facts. An opportunity to at least
"impeach, by cross-examination or otherwise," the evidence presented in
the brief may better elicit an accurate picture, or so Professor Freund
suggested in a classic work. 128 In any event, whether legislative facts are
appropriate to an evidentiary hearing or to a Brandeis Brief, they are
distinguishable from the "pure law" and thus your reference to them fails
to strengthen your critique of my views. Consider: sworn testimony about
the meaning of the law is rarely admissible in evidence; 19 on the other
hand, testimony bearing on legislative facts may be admitted at trial.
Indeed, your reference to legislative facts calls to mind how a particular
type of prejudice from premature announcement of commitment to a
change in legal doctrine may harm not only the future litigant before the
Court on that issue, but the sound development of the law as well. In
some areas "legislative facts" are in a state of flux regarding the facts
themselves (e.g. the age a fetus becomes viable) and/or knowledge of the
facts (e.g. the harmfulness of marijuana). 130 To rely on the existing state
of such "legislative facts" before compelled by the necessity of judgment
is to risk commitment to indefensible, because obsolete, doctrine.
Pre-commitment, on the bench, to a particular version of significant
legislative facts is particularly undesirable when the empirical evidence is
unclear or inconclusive, has only been recently subjected to a wide range
of scholarly investigation and it is continually being "updated" by
researchers."
Given Justice White's acknowledgement (albeit in Leon)" 2 of the
evolving and early stages of present research into the efficacy of the ex126 See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE 146-47 (1980)(where the author draws
the distinction between adjudicative facts, i.e., facts concerning inmediate parties, and legislative facts, i.e., those facts which are not about a particular party).
12
P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 87-89 (1949).

Id. at 89.
I"
McCoRMICK ON

EVIDENCE

§

12, at 31 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).

See generally Finer, supra note 125.
' At least one relevant and important study on the "costs" of the exclusionary rule was
unavailable at the time of the Gates concurrence but available to Justice White prior to the
Leon decision. See infra note 138; R. VAN DUIZAND, L. SuTrON & C. CARTER: THE SEARCH
130

WARRANT PROCESS
122

(1983).

See infra note 138.
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clusionary rule, did he not owe a duty to the eventual litigants to withhold gratuitous personal judgment and wait until their counsel could ad'3
dress matters as significant as the "legislative facts"' considered, if not
relied on, in Gates and Leon?
Given the rationale and analytical methodology of Justice White's concurrence in Gates and majority opinion in Leon, the impropriety of "finding" and giving weight to "legislative facts" before it became necessary to
do so was apparent. Justice White, in both opinions, expressed the belief
that empirical evidence of the "cost" of the exclusionary rule in terms of
"lost convictions" was of some relevance to determining whether the exclusionary rule should be retained where police rely in good faith on a
search warrant." 4
There is evidence that Justice White was misled in Gates regarding
seemingly high "costs" of the exclusionary rule (regarding "lost" felony
convictions in general, but particularly with regard to "lost" convictions
for felonies involving drugs.) 35 When the misleading and useless nature
of the statistics cited in the Gates concurrence (and cited in the SolicitorGeneral's briefs in both cases)136 was demonstrated in the brief on behalf
of Mr. Leon, 1 7 Justice White simply shifted ground in Leon13 8 (without
'13See supra note 125.
134 Compare Gates, 462 U.S. at 257-58 with Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3142-43.
" "The primary cost, of course, is that the exclusionary rule interferes with the truthseeking function of a criminal trial by barring relevant and trustworthy evidence." Gates,
462 U.S. at 257. The foregoing was accompanied by the following footnote:
The effects of the exclusionary rule are often felt before a case reaches trial. A
recent study of the National Institute of Justice of felony arrests in California
during the years 1976-1979 "found a major impact of the exclusionary rule on
state prosecutors" . . . .The study found that 4.8% of the more than 4000 felony
cases declined for prosecution were rejected because of search and seizure
problems. The exclusionary rule was found to have a particularlypronounced
effect in drug cases; prosecutors rejected approximately 30% of all felony drug
arrests because of search and seizure problems.
Id. at n.13 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
"I8 See Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 48-49, Gates; Brief
for Petitioner at 70, Leon; See also Brief for the United States at 69-70, Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 104 S.Ct. 3424 (1984).
"'
Petitioner claims that California prosecutors rejected 30% of all felony drug arrests
because of search and seizure problems. . . .This was based on samples of only a few
hundred cases from two of 21 Los Angeles County Prosecutor's Offices with atypically
high search-rejection rates and is totally unrepresentative of the state as a whole ....
The statewide figure, according to the statewide data source used by NIJ, is less than
three percent.
Brief for Respondent at 48, Leon (citations omitted). Counsel for Mr. Leon also called the
Court's attention to Justice White's misleading reference in Gates to the 4.8% figure: "The
4.8% figure is a percentage of declined arrests only and is not a useful figure." Id. at 47.
Finally, even were these figures not otherwise misleading, they did not reveal the influence
of California search and seizure law, they were not about or limited to searches with questionable search warrants, and they were otherwise flawed support for Justice White's conclusions in Gates.
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acknowledgement that he was doing so), evidently finding a quite insignificant, but more accurate, set of certain California data to be just as
compelling. 3 " Justice White's Leon opinion, notwithstanding, his (unacknowledged) correction (by omission) of these particular misuses of statistics, may not say as much about the corrective influence of Leon's arguments, as it does about the uncorrectable impact on Justice White of
the Gates opinion itself.
The influence of Justice White's pre-judgment/prejudicial concurrence
was manifest in his Leon opinion, which cited his Gates opinion eight
times. Indeed, the Solicitor-General appealed to Justice White's gratuitous pre-judgment/prejudicial Gates opinion four times in the government's brief in Leon and sixteen times in the Justice Department's amicus brief in Sheppard!
It doesn't facilitate rational and cool discussion to
repeatedly label Justice White's Gates concurrence as "gratuitous."
Surely you must know by now that the standards of good legal argument
require definition of such a questionable, yet evidently, crucial term.
LEARNED LAWYER:

By "gratuitous" I mean generally that in the
context it was neither justified nor excused. It was unnecessary to any
legitimate function of a separate opinion in that situation. Obviously, Justice White was not urging that the majority in Gates was in error with
regard to the question whether there is an exception to the exclusionary
rule. There was no fundamental disagreement regarding an exception to
the exclusionary rule between Justice White and the opinion expressed by
the majority; the majority decided not to decide that question and no
dissent raised it either. Where there is disagreement, there is abundant
justification for speaking out.
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

You mean you'd muzzle Justices who didn't write
or join in a single opinion of the Court?
LEARNED LAWYER:

I didn't say that. But Justice White's opinion
in Gates, declaring in great detail his views on the good-faith, reasonableRECENT LAW GRADUATE:

'

Researchers have only recently begun to study extensively the effects of the exclusionary rule on the disposition of felony arrests. One study suggests that the rule results in
the nonprosecution or nonconviction of between 0.6% and 2.35% of individuals arrested for felonies. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn)
About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of
"Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 611, 621. The estimates are higher for
particular crimes the prosecution of which depends heavily on physical evidence. Thus
the cumulative loss due to nonprosecution or nonconviction of individuals arrested
on felony drug charges is probably in the range of 2.8% to 7.1%. Id.
Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3413, n.6 (emphasis added). The figures in the Davies study were a correction of the misleading conclusions by the National Institute of Justice from its California
study, cited in Justice White's Gates concurrence.
1"9 See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
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ness exception to the exclusionary rule, was arguably gratuitous in several
significant respects.
Justice White's elaborate analysis and firmly asserted convictions regarding the propriety or necessity of a good-faith, police-reasonableness
exception to the exclusionary rule in search warrant situations, was gratuitous in that they were not even necessary to explain his own vote in
Gates (a matter, which, ordinarily, of course, the judge alone could determine). In his Gates concurrence, Justice White did embrace an alternative ground for voting with the majority. That alternative ground to both
the holding and Justice White's advocacy of a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule was that the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements were satisfied by the Illinois prosecution in its warrant application. 4 He also concluded that these requirements were constitutionally appropriate, thus
disagreeing with the majority's overruling of them. While the discussion
of the meaning and application of the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements were
arguably "gratuitous" in the sense that it was not strictly necessary to
explain his vote (being an alternative to his declaration of a good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule in warrant situations), it was 1) partially explanatory of Justice White's vote,1" 1 2) within the scope of the
arguments the majority held were properly before the Court, 3) a relatively narrow interpretation of existing law as it applied to a particular
set of facts, 4) more or less oriented to a few cases like the one before him
(rather than reflecting a generalized, frequently occurring fact situation),
5) not addressed to a major issue of considerable consequence to our legal
system, and 6) not concerned with a question obviously on the Court's
immediate horizon.
I don't see of what relevance it is to your point that
another case was or was not "on the horizon." For one thing, exclusionary
rule cases are before the Court every single term, so the issue was as
much "on the horizon" when Justice White and others wrote separate
opinions in earlier cases as it was in Gates; for another, an opinion either
LEARNED LAWYER:

The Gates majority opinion overruled the prior decisions of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). These prior decisions required

that when an informant's tip is relied on in a warrant application certain showings must be
made (e.g., the informant's reliability, the source of his information, and the strength of
independent corroboration). The Aguilar-Spinelli test was replaced in Gates with a totality-

of-the-circumstances approach. It was over the continued validity of Aguilar and Spinelli
that Justice White's Gates concurrence disagreed with the majority. Gates, 462 U.S. at 26774.
7" It has been observed that it is important that
a judge explain his vote so that the
parties can know that justice has been done. This point rings true when the judge's vote
contributed to the outcome. Dissenting opinions have a special role and significance. See
infra notes 149-54 and accompanying text. Where, however, a judge can explain this view
without publicly pre-judging issues of great moment, or where the judges's vote does not
contribute to the outcome and the judge is not a protesting dissenter, the importance of the
concurrence to the development of the law is tenuous.
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is or is not improper, regardless of what and when a question may later
come before the Court.
I consider the fact that the question was on
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:
the Court's immediate horizon to be of special significance in weighing
the harm apparently done by the Gates concurrence, since, for one thing,
the prejudicial impact of the statement has less chance to be offset by
other teachings of time and experience; and for another, the appearance
of pre-judgment would be very strong when the Justice's words are still
ringing in the high chamber of the palace of marble.
Here we do not have to speculate that the issue was on the horizon.
There was little question that at least five other Justices were eager to
take up the issue of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The
Court ordered the parties in Gates to brief the issue even though it was
42
Not
not urged or argued below or in the original certiorari petition.'
only did the Court thus go on record as determined to decide the issue,
when it found it imprudent to reach the issue in Gates, it made it even
more clear that it firmly intended to take it up at the first legitimate
43
opportunity, by "apologi[zing] to all" in Gates' for not addressing the
144
just nineteen days after the anissue. Certiorari was granted in Leon
nouncement of decision in Gates.
Your "rules for permissible concurrences" are still
LEARNED LAWYER:
Justice
White's vote was necessary to constitute a
Suppose
fuzzy.
quite
majority in Gates. Would his (concurring) opinion regarding an exception
to the exclusionary rule be less objectionable? Or would your "ethics of
law-impartiality" mandate a concurrence without opinion on the subject? 4 5 Suppose he had concluded, as he did, that Aguilar and Spinelli

1'2 The issue of good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was first raised in a Motion
by the State of Illinois for Leave to Amend or Enlarge Question Presented for Review,
Gates (filed on Feb. 8, 1982). The Court unanimously denied that motion. Gates, 455 U.S.
986 (1982).
On October 13, 1982, the parties presented oral argument, which, respecting the Court's

ruling, did not address the question of whether an exception for good faith police behavior
should be read into the exclusionary rule.
On November 29, 1982, the Court, over the dissent of Justice Stevens (Justices Brennan
and Marshall joining), restored the case to calender for reargument and ordered the parties
to address the following question:
Whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, [citing Mapp and Weeks], should to any

extent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the exclusion of evidence
obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
Gates, 459 U.S. 1028 (1982).
Gates, 462 U.S. at 217.
Gates was decided on June 8, 1983. 462 U.S. 213. Certiorari was granted in Leon on
June 27, 1983. 103 S.Ct. 3535.
"I Since he would be giving, as he did, an alternative reason for upholding the decision.
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should not be overruled, but believed (contrary to his actual views) that
the state had not met the preconditions of those cases for demonstrating
probable cause: Would his concurrence, declaring his opinion regarding a
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule have then been acceptable,
even desirable, or would your ethics of law impartiality limit him to notation of his vote? Should the answer depend on whether his vote was necessary to constitute a majority""8 (on the ground that the parties and the
public are entitled to know the principles and rationale supporting the
Court's disposition of a case)? 147 How does the notion of impartiality regarding legal doctrine affect the propriety of dicta in opinions of the
14
Court? 1

Moreover, you speak as if Justice White was thoughtless about the significance of his speaking out in Gates. But he explained why there was a
need to speak out. He stated that:
The Court's straining not to come to grips with the exclusionary rule issue today may be hard for the country to understand-particularly given earlier statements by some Members of
the Court .

. .

. The issue is central to the enforcement of law

and to the administration of justice throughout the Nation. The
Court of Appeals for the second largest federal circuit has already
adopted such an exception and the new Eleventh Circuit is presumably bound by its decision. Several members of this Court
have for some time expressed the need to consider modifying the
exclusionary rule . . . and Congress as well has been active in exploring the question . . . . At least one state has already enacted
a good faith exception . . . . I see it as our responsibility to end

the uncertainty and decide whether the rule will be modified. 149

You've gone on at some length about non-majority or non-decisional
opinions. But what about Holmes and Brandeis, Black and Douglas?
They were "Great Dissenters." Did you ever
hear the expression "Great Concurrer"?
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

LEARNED LAWYER:

Don't your "prudential" criticisms of non-deci-

There is also the somewhat meaningless or at least unanswerable question of whose
vote is necessary to constitute the majority (e.g., where those favoring a particular disposi140

tion are split 3-3 in their rationale.)
-

It is equally arguable that even when five justices agree on both disposition and ra-

tionale, the concurring and/or dissenting views of the other Justices are important to the
public's and the parties' understanding of what the whole Court did and why.
48 Cf. Fiss & Krauthammer, The Rehnquist Court, New Republic, March 10, 1982, at 14.
In referring to Justice Rehnquist's opinions for the majority, the authors state that "he
places apparently inconsequential statements unobtrusively in one opinion, only to use them
several opinions later-when he makes them seem of central importance to the earlier case
and decisive to the case at hand." Id. at 16.
14 462 U.S. at 253-54 (citations omitted).
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sional opinions apply equally to dissents?
Dissenting opinions play a unique role in our
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:
constitutional jurisprudence. They are the voices protesting the outcome
or the injustice to the losing party. That is why dissents are so important.
While some have suggested that withholding dissents is itself a special
virtue, " ' as Chief Justice Hughes wrote: "A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a

future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into
which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed."'16
LEARNED LAWYER:

You've made a point for me. Isn't it obvious that

the quoted words reveal that the Chief Justice had in mind published
opinions which help shape the law of the future, a concept which would
encompass concurrences?
Moreover, you took that old chestnut of a quote out of context. In context, what Chief Justice Hughes said could well be applied to concurrences, particularly to Justice White's opinion. Chief Justice Hughes
said-just before the words you've quoted:
[Justices] are not there merely to decide cases, but to decide
them as they think they should be decided, and while it may be
regrettable that they cannot always agree, it is better that their
independence be maintained and recognized than that unanimity
should be secured through its sacrifice.
This does not mean that a judge should be swift to dissent, or
that he should dissent for the sake of self-exploitation or because
of a lack of that capacity for cooperation which is of the essence
of any group action . .

.

.Dissenting opinions enable a judge to

express his individuality. He is not under the compulsion of
speaking for and thus of securing the concurrence of a majority.
In dissent, he is a free lance. 6 2
Aren't these points'" also applicable to concurring opinions?
Not really. Dissents have the special significance of letting it be known that at least one Justice believes an injustice
was done to the losing party. It is important that in Gates Justice White
was not expressing any feeling that the majority had done an injustice to
the losing party or had "betrayed" the true law regarding the exclusionRECENT LAW GRADUATE:

'" See, e.g., L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 72-73 (1958); C. AUERBACH, L. GARRISON, C.
HURST & S. MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS 357-60 (1961); B. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKPURTER CONNECTION 88 (1983).
I" C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

68 (1928)(emphasis added).

Id. at 67-68.
''
See also Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 J. AM.
Soc'Y 104 (1948).
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ary rule. The subject of the merits of Justice White's views was simply
not addressed by the majority or any other Justice in Gates.
LEARNED LAWYER:
A concurrence can protest the "injustice" of a majority doctrine to the national legal system. You seem almost sentimentally attached to the "rights" of the parties fortuitously before the Court,
a Court which must interpret the Constitution and laws which govern a
nation. If, as you concede, there are no prudential limits on dissenting
opinions, you can justify such limits on concurring opinions only by focussing on the concerns of parties before the Court; and that might well
be at the expense of the interests of sound development of our laws.
More problematic still is your apparent suggestion that Justice White
could say the same thing in dissent without warranting your "prudential"
criticism. Indeed, he did previously express his reading of a good-faith
1 54
exception to the exclusionary rule in a dissent in Stone v. Powell.

Moreover, wouldn't your argument necessarily label "imprudent" a (hypothetical) pre-Furman concurrence, by, for example, Justices Brennan
and Marshall, on eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment
grounds, in a capital case that happened to reverse a death sentence on a
narrower ground?
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:
On matters of prudence, each Justice must
weigh prudential considerations against the felt urgency of speaking out.
LEARNED LAWYER:

Wasn't Justice White doing just that in Gates?

RECENT LAW GRADUATE:
With Leon on the docket? And Sheppard?
And numerous other fourth amendment cases inevitably coming up to the
Court?
LEARNED LAWYER:
There were a lot of death cases coming up to the
Court too. Would Brennan and Marshall be required to wait until they
were in dissent or until the eighth amendment point was raised?
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:
But really, the exclusionary rule is one thing,
the death penalty is another. Had Justices Brennan and Marshall voted
that way it would have been because they felt the death penalty was unconscionable-an extreme sanction.
LEARNED LAWYER:
"Extreme sanction"? Justice White's very words
(twice stated in Leon)'5 5 to describe the exclusionary rule. A Justice who
feels so strongly about a matter must be allowed to speak out.
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:
Of course a Justice must be "free to speak
[his mind]."' 56 What I am suggesting are self-adopted prudential con-

:54 428

U.s. 465, 536 (1976)(White, J., dissenting).

" Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3418, 3423.
101Douglas, supra note 153, at 107.
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straints of time, place and manner-a notion that might resonate with
other concepts in the minds of persons "truly learned in the law."
LEARNED LAWYER:

May I say just one thing?

RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

By all means.

That law school you just attended. Did they teach
LEARNED LAWYER:
you Justice Holmes' definition of the law?
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

Uh, oh.

The law, Holmes said, is nothing more or less than
LEARNED LAWYER:
157
In view of that, how can it
a prediction of what judges will in fact do.
be denied that Justice White's concurrence in Gates was valuable? A contribution to the growth and understanding of the law? Did it not make it
easier for the profession and the public to predict how Justice White at
least would cast his vote on the issue when it came before him? Justice
White's statement of his views contributed to the development of the law
in the sense that Holmes defined the law. It is a service to the law to
declare what direction your understanding of the law is taking.
I know all that. But for one thing, a definition is not an admonition to anyone to do anything, except that I'll grant
that Holmes' definition alerts attorneys to the important basis of sound
legal advice to a client.
In the second place, the definition used as justification would license
Justices in saying any damn thing they pleased, on the theory that since
the law is how they are going to vote they might as well let everyone
know at the first opportunity: sans briefs, sans oral arguments, sans
strong differences with the rest of the Court, and notwithstanding real,
identifiable litigants of the issue waiting in the wings. Holmes' statement,
not being normative, was not inconsistent with the later thoughts expressed by Professors Bickel and Freund. As Alexander Bickel taught us:
"the Court does not sit to make precatory pronouncements. It is not a
synod of bishops, nor a collective poet laureate. It does not sit, Mr.
Freund has remarked, 'to compose for the anthologies.' "161
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

LEARNED LAWYER:

I doubt that Professor Bickel would agree with you.

Indeed, I think your quote backfires. Professor Bickel was referring to a
decision of the Supreme Court (and the Court, mind you, not an opinion
of a single Justice) holding impermissible separate schools for black and
white students, respectively, an opinion which announced a principle but

O1.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1921). See also
Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case Presentations, 37 A.B.A. J. 801, 863 (1951).
158 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 246 (1962).
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postponed its effectuation." 9 The fact that the Court followed it up with
a remedial decision legitimized the first decision, as I read the late Yale
Professor.16 0
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

Again we disagree. I read it as critical of judi-

cial pronouncements that have extra-legal consequences without the force
of law behind them.
Moreover, one of the vital processes of adjudication is collegial exchange of views. It is not clear that Justice White had the benefit of that,
since his colleagues did not address themselves to the issue until the following year. And, as I've noted, in writing as comprehensive an opinion in
Gates as he would later write in Leon, he took a position without responsibility for it, without having to bear the consequences of judgment. Perhaps that is one of the reasons he was so careless about the statistics he
chose to employ.
LAWYER:
You've still not answered my previous question:
Stone v. Powell""' seems to put a part of your thesis to the test. In an
opinion by Justice Powell, joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens and Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that federal
habeas corpus relief would not be granted to state prisoners who had unsuccessfully sought, in the state system, application of the exclusionary
rule to evidence seized and used against them. 6 ' The rationale of Stone
was that federal habeas corpus would contribute little, if anything, to the
deterrent efficacy of the exclusionary rule.
Justice White felt, in dissenting, "constrained to say that . . . [he]
would join four or more other Justices in substantially limiting the reach
of the exclusionary rule .
"'13
,
He declared that he was
LEARNED

of the view that the rule should be substantially modified so as to
prevent its application in those many circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in the good-faith
belief that his conduct comported with existing law and having
reasonable grounds for this belief."
Justice White then advanced reasons for his proposed limitation on the
exclusionary rule. 166

119 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953).

"' See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also BICKEL, supra note 158, at
244-47.
--- 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
.62 This is true at least where the state prisoner had been given an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of their claims by the state system. Id. at 494.
',,
Id. at 537.
164 Id.
at 538.
'e
Among the asserted reasons were that excluding evidence obtained by reasonable police action: a) can have no deterrent effect; b) fails to cure the invasion of the defendant's
rights; c) distorts the fact-finding function of trials; and d) "seriously shortchanges the pub-
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So why have you cited it?

To persuade you of the unsoundness of what I take
to be your thesis. If Leon had followed Stone by thirteen months, you
would be hard pressed to justify treating Stone as non-prejudicial, while
treating Gates as prejudicial, merely because the former took the form of
a dissent and the latter of a concurrence.
Moreover, Chief Justice Burger, while concurring in the majority in
Stone, wrote a separate concurrence urging restrictions on the exclusionary rule.'" How do those two opinions compare on your scale of prudence
and circumspection? Would you condemn the concurrence but not the
dissent?
LEARNED LAWYER:

I could easily criticize Justice White's opinion in Stone without contradicting what you take to be my thesis regarding distinctions between concurrences and dissents. Justice White's exclusionary rule discussion in Stone was not a dissent.
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

LEARNED LAWYER:

Excuse me?

It just looked like a dissent because it was
part of what followed the words "Mr. Justice White, dissenting." Justice
White actually voted to uphold the claims of the state prisoners, while
the majority rejected them. All the discussion about the exclusionary rule
was truly gratuitous in Stone. Nothing turned on it; Justice White was
not protesting an erroneous outcome. He dissented because he did not
accept the majority's conclusion that the substantive constitutional rights
reviewable by federal habeas courts regarding state prisoner's collateral
appeals are less encompassing than the rights reviewable where collateral
claims are made by federal prisoners. Your classic dissenting opinions are
dissents that assert views opposed to those that moved the majority and
disagree with the holding of the case itself. So, paradoxically, were Justice
White truly dissenting in the classic sense in Stone, on the matter of a
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, he might well have concurred or at least examined the record of the cases for evidence bearing
on good faith, or perhaps even remanded the cases for hearings on the
presence or absence of good faith on the part of the police.
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

Then why not come right out and say the discussion of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Stone was
imprudent of Justice White?
LEARNED LAWYER:

lic interest." Id. at 540-42. The admission of such evidence, Justice White continued, did
not inculpate judges in "the mistaken but unintentional and faultless" fourth amendment
violations. Id. at 540.
68 The Chief Justice stated that the exclusionary rule should apply only when there has
been "egregious, bad-faith conduct." Id. at 501.
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Because there is a sense in which Justice
White was acting more prudently by dissenting than he would have been
had he concurred and advanced his exclusionary rule position as the sole
basis of his concurrence.
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

I take it that you mean that the question of a goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule was not before the Court in
Stone?
LEARNED LAWYER:

RECENT LAW GRADUATE:
LEARNED LAWYER:

That certainly is a factor.

A factor? What else do you have in mind?

Our discussion has facilitated my realization
that the law sometimes moves and grows by "urgings." Dicta give us
something to think about; they focus our attention on what one or more
Justices see as a flaw or possible flaw in our legal or constitutional doctrines. Maybe the urging of a new interpretation is more prudent when
that urging is not backed up by a vote.
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

LEARNED LAWYER:

What about the lack of "responsibility" you spoke

of earlier?
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

It is still something to worry about.

And how can you justify condemning Chief Justice
Burger's Stone concurrence or Justice White's Gates concurrence?
LEARNED LAWYER:

The Chief Justice's separate concurrence was
also gratuitous in the sense that it was not necessary for his vote and
would not have been a proper basis for his vote, since the issue was not
raised.
And Justice White's Gates concurrence, although dealing with a point
that had been briefed and argued, was announcing a "result" in a pending
or impending case, and, like the Chief Justice's Stone concurrence, went
far beyond the urging of reconsideration of existing doctrine or consideration of new doctrine. Urgings are one thing; declarations of commitment
to modifications, particularly major modifications, or reversals, of existing
law are another.
I am not concerned with concurrences that offer a different reason for
the same disposition as the majority, where the issue is raised and the
opinion is necessary to explain the Justice's vote in a way less pre-judgmental than an alternative explanation for that vote. Some concurrences
say the plurality or majority rationale is wrong and are the only way the
Justice can explain his or her vote for the same disposition; some concurrences are protesting nothing in the majority or plurality opinion. Either
category can accompany either a vote necessary or unnecessary to produce a majority for a disposition; and where the vote is unnecessary to
produce a majority for a particular disposition of a case, the Justice's rationale may or may not be superfluous, i.e., there may or may not be a
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:
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majority of other Justices agreeing on another rationale.
LAWYER:
Doesn't the meaning of your ambivalence toward
Justice White's Stone dissent necessarily embrace concurrences that are
not backed by the weight of an operational vote? Aren't such concurrences more justifiable than concurrences that are necessary to produce a
majority decision, since, in the latter case, the law of the case includes the
iconoclastic Justice's rationale?
LEARNED

RECENT LAW GRADUATE:
If the rationale is necessary to explain the
Justice's vote, then it is not pre-judicial or pre-judgmental or gratuitous.
Depending on the case, the opinion may or may not be subject to the
criticism that it pronounced upon an issue that was not raised and/or not
argued by the parties. Justice White's concurrence in Gates would have
been more justifiable had he not alternatively asserted a narrower basis
for concurring, and subject to little, if any, criticism along the lines I've
suggested, were his views on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule the only basis of his concurrence and there were not at least five
other Justices who desired an alternative and narrower rationale.
Enter: Professor of Law.
PROFESSOR OF LAW:
Excuse me, but I could not help overhearing much
of this conversation, I've been in the next booth having some coffee and
trying to read through these latest advance sheets. Instead, I've found
myself meditating upon your thesis, young man.
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:
What do you think Professor? Am I getting
close to the wisest criteria?
PROFESSOR OF LAW:
Frankly, until your recent exegesis on the typology of separate opinions, justified and unjustified, in concurrence and in
dissent, you had me interested. Now you are sounding as one trying to
formulate the hair-splitting principles of common law pleadings and apply them to the least legalistic judges in the civilized world-on a matter
that lends itself to such divergent sensibilities and subjective judgments,
too. Your concerns of law-partiality, or the appearance of law-partiality,
are only part of the gestalt of considerations that should inform the intelligence and feelings of a Justice contemplating a separate opinion. On
matters as delicate as this, rules or guidelines, even if "logically" capable
of formulation, would spoil your contribution. If somehow your ideas
found their way into the hallowed chambers and raised the judicial consciousness, that would be an accomplishment.
One point. While I understand your reluctance to rest your case on the
right to a hearing, I would generally push the case for the right of a party
at risk of judgment to a hearing. Argumentation is a significant aspect of
responsive and thus, more responsible government. One of the ideas of an
open society is an addressable government, addressable regarding matters
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of personal justice; addressable regarding formulation of national legal
policy. For if the Court is to make national legal policy, a function which
we come to accept, then someone with the perspective of an outsider to
the judicial bureaucracy, and with a stake in the Supreme Court's decision, must be able to have a word with it.
If I may continue my critique. There was an arguably important reason,
a reason you failed to address, regarding the dubiety of applying your
ideal of appearance of law-impartiality to Justice White's role in Gates
and Leon. While Mr. Leon had juridical standing to urge application of
the exclusionary rule, he was hardly deserving of equitable considerations.
Reasons analogous to those that led the Court in Stone v. Powell to deny
federal habeas relief or review to state prisoners asserting state court violations of the Mapp exclusionary rule weaken your argument that the
law-partiality of Justice White, among other detrimental effects, denied a
fair hearing to Mr. Leon. Leon was in no danger of being unfairly convicted-of being found guilty although innocent-by virtue of the Court's
recognition of a new exception to the exclusionary rule. The extant conception of the rationale of the exclusionary rule denies the existence of
any personal right on the part of the accused. The accused is at best a
means to an end beyond determination of his guilt or innocence, that end
being the deterrence of official wrongdoing. Other than whether Leon
should be the incidental beneficiary of a judicial policy designed to inhibit violations of the fourth amendment, there was no question of Leon
facing an unfair trial.
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:

But my learned and seasoned adversary

never made such an argument.
PROFESSOR OF LAW:

Not to call to mind and confront points that

might reasonably be thought to call your thesis into question is to practice the worst kind of Unilateral Adversarialism. Even if your opponent
should never raise the point, the Court well might, and there's no guaranteeing that you won't first learn of it when reading the opinion rather
than during questioning at oral argument. Moreover, you'll find it well
worthwhile to ponder your ethical obligations in this area-to the Court
and to your adversary-regarding an argument, a case or line of cases, or
a statute that your adversary seems to have overlooked.
LAW GRADUATE:
Professor, your points about good lawyering
may be well taken, but I question your substantive reservations. They
prove too much.
The ideal of fairness to litigants before the Court, one of the bases for
my criticism of prejudicial concurrences, rests on their status of being at
risk of judgment by the Court. Were the probable guilt of the defendant
to determine what is just or fair in securing a conviction in violation of
the existing exclusionary rule, or in reviewing such a conviction, the
Court would have long since abolished the harmless error test and reRECENT
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quired convicted defendants to establish on appeal probable trial
prejudice from violations of the exclusionary rule.
Justice White's declaration of law was, all things considered, an extravagance. It was imprudent. It probably closed his mind to the arguments
of Leon, whose presence before the Court, through his attorney, fulfilled a
vital function in our judicial system-for himself, for the development of
the law of exclusion, and for all litigants whose more appealing claims to
individualized justice would be jeopardized by such immediately prior
and gratuitous concurrences.
I now realize, however, that were any specific criteria to be offered for
the exercise of judgment whether or not to write a particular opinion,
they would be entirely self enforcing, as much of the rules and canons of
judicial ethics are now anyway. More important, and the reason why I
will not offer a formula, is that this is a matter best governed by each
7
Justice's sense of what is appropriate." Perhaps some thoughts offered
herein would commend themselves to individual judges and Justices; perhaps many of these ideas would not. Perhaps this discussion would at
least "raise the consciousness" of some judges or Justices so as to sensitize them to the problem and encourage them to adopt personal prudential guidelines for rendition of separate opinions. The important thing is
to heighten awareness that, in some circumstances at least, separate opinions can harm the process and the legitimate expectations of litigants. To
employ a now overused, but still serviceable expression, I am addressing
the ethics of aspiration rather than the ethics of duty.'
Well, in any event, it seems that all the arguments
PROFESSOR OF LAW:
are now on the table.
May I close now with some wisdom for the
RECENT LAW GRADUATE:
ages? Professor Bickel saw a paradox in the idea that cases of profound
national significance must be decided in the context of a concrete case or
controversy between parties; yet, the particular interest of litigants are, in

.67Publ. Utilities Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952)(where Justice Frankfurter recused himself from a case involving a streetcar company's right to program music into its
passenger vehicles because his "feelings were so strongly engaged as a victim of the practice
in controversy." Id. at 467).
I The concepts of morality of duty and a morality of aspiration were brilliantly developed by Professor Lon Fuller. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1969). The notion of

aspirational ethics is also embodied in the A.B.A. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1982), which set out two levels of ethical responsibility:
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives towards which every member of the professional should strive ....
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Consideration, are mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no
lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.
CODE (Preamble and Preliminary Statement).
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Bickel's view, relatively unimportant at the Supreme Court level." 9 Well
Tocqueville, with whom Professor Bickel was far better acquainted than
I, observed how keeping Justices within the traditional constraints on
judges everywhere will best protect the legislature against unwise use of
the power of judicial review-a peculiarly American institution.170 I submit that reflection by each Justice upon such traditional constraints will
also best protect the development of law generally and best assure fairness to parties.
De Tocqueville observed that a
characteristic of judicial power is, that it pronounces on special
cases, and not upon general principles. . . . [If [a judge] directly
attacks a general principle without having a particular case in
view, he leaves the circle in which all nations have agreed to confine his authority; he assumed a more important, and perhaps a
more useful influence, than that of the magistrate; but he ceases
to represent the judicial power.
[Another] characteristic of the judicial power is, that it can
only act when it is called upon, or when, in legal phrase, it has
taken cognizance of an affair. This characteristic . . . may be regarded as essential; the judicial power is, by its nature, devoid of
action; it must be put in motion in order to produce a result.
When it is called upon to repress a crime it punishes the criminal;
when a wrong is to be redressed it is ready to redress it; when an
act requires interpretation, it is prepared to interpret it; but it
does not pursue criminals, hunt out wrongs, or examine evidence
of its own accord.'
So, as I read him, Tocqueville understood that the power of the Court is
soundly limited if it adopts as a maxim, "do not speak until spoken to."
A distinguished critic of judicial activism once referred to the majority
in Mapp v. Ohio as a Court "intoxicat[ed] with its own power."' 72 If you
investigate the history of 28 U.S.C. § 47, the provision barring a judge
from hearing an appeal from his own decision, you would learn that a
proponent of that legislation declared that
[s]uch an appeal is not from Philip drunk to Philip sober, but
from Philip sober to Philip intoxicated with the vanity of mature
opinion and doubtless a published decision."'

See generally A. BICKEL,
170

1

THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
See A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 72-75 (R. Heffner ed. 1953).
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 170, at 73-74 (emphasis added).
p. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 78 (1970).
P72
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 114, at 595.
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More words of wisdom? And you dare speak of

prudence!"7

17, It has been suggested that the Leon decision might well be the first step toward a
broader "good-faith" exception-one that will eventually encompass police behavior in situations where no warrant has been issued. LaFave "The Seductive Call of Expediency:
United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. I1L. L. Rav. 895, 930-31.
However, Leon held only that "evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate . . . should be admissible in the prosecution's
case-in-chief." 104 S.Ct. at 3416. On the same day that Leon was decided, Justice White
dissented in a case that rejected a claim that the exclusionary rule applies to civil deportation proceedings-a case involving an unlawful warrantless search. I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza,
104 S.Ct. 3479 (1984). Justice White unblinkingly described the Leon holding in the following terms: "In United States v. Leon, we have held that the exclusionary rule is not applicable when officers are acting in objective good faith." Id. at 3493 (White, J. dissenting).
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